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Should a Surviving "Spouse" in a SameSex Couple Be
Permitted to Sue for Wrongful Death?
A New York Court Will Have a Chance to Decide
By JOANNA GROSSMAN
lawjlg@hofstra.edu


Tuesday, Feb. 25, 2003
Neal Spicehandler was allegedly the victim first of a driver's hitandrun spree, and then of medical malpractice.
When he arrived at St. Vincent's Hospital in New York, he had only a broken leg. A few days later, however, he
died from a blood clot.
Spicehandler's partner, John Langan, has filed a wrongful death suit against St. Vincent's in New York Court.
Langan claims that Spicehandler's death was the result of St. Vincent's medical malpractice. But before he begins
to try to prove his case, Langan will have to establish that he has the right to sue in the first place.
Spicehandler and Langan were joined together in a November 2000 civil union in Vermont. Under Vermont law,
such a union is equivalent in all respects to a marriage. (For more on Vermont civil unions, see my prior column.)
But under New York's wrongful death statute, does the civil union mean Langan was Spicehandler's "spouse," and
thus is entitled to sue? That is the question a New York court may soon decide
What a Wrongful Death Suit Is, And Who Can Be A Plaintiff
Who can be the plaintiff in a wrongful death suit? In New York, the right to sue belongs to the deceased person's
"distributees." In turn, a "distributee" is defined as a person who would inherit under the state's system of
intestacy  that is, its system setting forth the laws of descent and distribution for those who die intestate
(without a will).
One possible distributee is the deceased person's surviving spouse. That leads to a key question for Langan's
wrongful death suit: Is a partner in a samesex civil union a "spouse" under the provision of New York's Estates,
Powers, and Trusts Law governing wrongful death suits?
Vermont Would Allow Langan to Sue For Wrongful Death
To support his argument, Langan argues that the very reason he and Spicehandler entered into a Vermont Civil
Union was to ensure that each would have rights in the event that the other died. And, indeed, that was one of
Vermont's purposes in creating the civil union status.
Vermont's civil union is meant to be a marriage equivalent. Pursuant to the statute, every right and benefit
accruing to oppositesex spouses accrues to samesex civil union partners. Among the many laws amended by the
Civil Union law was the wrongful death statute. Thus, had Spicehandler died in Vermont, Langan would clearly
have the right to sue.
Langan also notes that, in addition to entering into the Vermont civil union, each member of the couple also
executed a will, and bought life insurance, naming the other as the beneficiary. In addition, each executed a
health care proxy giving the other the power to make medical decisions for him.
In sum, Langan and Spicehandler are the ideal test case, for they did everything possible within their power to
become, in effect, spouses. If a samesex couple ever can be spouses, they were that couple.
The hospital has argued, however, that in New York, Langan does not qualify as a Spicehandler's surviving spouse.
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In support of its argument, the hospital notes that New York, unlike Vermont, has no civil union law.
Is a New York court likely to accept this argument? It's unclear  in part because most relevant New York
precedents predate the Vermont Civil Union statute and the new issues it raises.
Prior to the advent of civil unions, unmarried samesex partners had tried to persuade New York courts to consider
them to be spouses. Once, they succeeded: A New York court interpreted the New York City rent control law to
include a samesex partner in the definition of "family" entitled to assume an apartment after a tenant's death.
But mostly, they lost.
In the 1993 case of In re Cooper, an intermediate New York appellate court refused to allow a samesex partner to
renounce his partner's will, which had given him less than he would have been statutorily entitled to as a legal
spouse. The plaintiff argued that the statute's term "surviving spouse" was broad enough to include an intimate
partner in a marriagelike relationship. He had also argued that the statute, if it excluded samesex partners,
violated the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause in that it unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation. The court rejected both arguments.
Later, in the 1998 case of Raum v. Restaurant Associates, a different appellate court in New York refused to allow
a homosexual partner to bring a wrongful death suit for his partner's death, on the ground that he was not a
surviving "spouse." The statute is the same one Langan is trying to invoke. The partners in Raum, however, had
not entered into a civil union (and could not have, since the Vermont statute had yet to be enacted).
These precedents may seem to spell defeat for Langan, but in fact, the passage of the Vermont Civil Union
statute, preceded by the enactment of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), may have changed the legal
territory quite significantly.
The Relevance of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and of DOMA
The U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause (located in Article IV, section 1) says that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
Langan argues, as a result, that New York must give "full faith and credit" to the Vermont judgment deeming
Langan and Spicehandler to be partners in a civil union, with all the consequences that entails.
The question of whether he is right is complicated. Article IV of the Constitution also states that "Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."
Congress has enacted the Full Faith and Credit Act, which declares that states must give the same effect to
judgments as the state in which they originated would. Arguably, a public policy exception to this mandate has
developed, which permits states to refuse to recognize judgments that are against their own public policy.
This rule has always been understood to protect states from having to recognize marriages that are polygamous,
for example, even if one state amended its laws to make them permissible.
Another relevant source of law is the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which amends the Full Faith and Credit Act.
DOMA was meant to target Hawaii (which never did legalize samesex marriage, in the end), not Vermont. But it
still may hurt Langan's ability to base his New York case on his and Spicehandler's Vermont civil union.
In addition to making clear that, for federal law purposes, a "marriage" is a union between "one man and one
woman" and a "spouse" is married to someone of the opposite sex, DOMA also provides that one state need not
honor another state's recognition of a "relationship between persons of the same sex treated as a marriage."
Langan argues that DOMA does not apply to him because it speaks only about relationships treated "as a
marriage," and a civil union was purposefully given a name other than "marriage."
But even if DOMA applies, does it permit New York to refuse to accord full faith and credit to Vermont's act of
recognizing Langan's and Spicehandler's union? Not necessarily.
Whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause permits Congress to decide how much credit to give the judgments of a
sister state, as opposed to creating a mechanism for sharing them, is unclear. One interpretation of the
Constitution is that it permits Congress to increase the amount of credit due sister state judgments, but not to
decrease it. Under that interpretation, DOMA may be unconstitutional.
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/grossman/20030225.html
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Surely Article IV did not intend to give Congress the power to eliminate the guarantee of Full Faith and Credit
entirely. More likely, the "effect" language was to allow Congress to standardize how states accorded effect to out
ofstate judgments  not to allow Congress to assure states they didn't have to accord outofstate judgments any
effect at all. The latter state of affairs, after all, would have threatened the Union the Framers worked so hard to
create.
The Relevance of New York's Lack of A "MiniDOMA"
Consistent with the prevailing interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and DOMA, courts can cite public
policy reasons to refuse to accord full faith and credit to marriages celebrated in other states.
Consider, for instance, that New York's law governing marriage itself is gender neutral: It does not say samesex
unions are permitted, but neither does it say they are barred. At least one court in New York has held that a clerk
has no authority to issue a marriage license to a samesex couple. But that is not necessarily the correct legal
answer, and New York's highest court has yet to rule on this issue.
The Bar of the City of New York is currently deciding whether to make a formal recommendation that New York
recognize samesex couples, at least to the extent of providing them the rights associated with marital unions.
And New York City passed a local law last summer providing that parties to a civil union are automatically entitled
to the benefits of being in a registered domestic partnership in the city without reregistering their relationship.
Subsequent to the passage of the federal DOMA, more than thirtyfive states passed legislation  socalled "mini
DOMAs"  declaring that they, indeed, would not recognize samesex marriages entered into in other states.
However, New York was not one of those states  and that fact may be very helpful to Langan. Without a New
York miniDOMA, arguably the federal DOMA is irrelevant to New York.
On this view, DOMA made an offer to allow states not to credit outofstate samesex marriages; thirtyfive states
accepted that offer; but it was an offer that other states  such as New York  could, and did, refuse. (This
interpretation is especially compelling when one notes that those who voted for DOMA were generally also big
believers in states' rights.)
Evidence that New York did not take the feds up on the offer they extended in DOMA can also be drawn from
other sources. For instance, unlike many other states, New York also lacks any legislation or attorney general's
opinion expressly stating that it is against the state's public policy to recognize a samesex union from another
state.
It also recently enacted SONDA (the Sexual Orientation NonDiscrimination Act), which amends all existing human
rights and education laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, in addition to those
characteristics already protected. It is not inconceivable that a state may have a public policy against sexual
orientation discrimination for employment and education purposes and yet permit such discrimination in the
marriage context. Yet SONDA, standing alone, suggests perhaps the state's public policy is broadly opposed to
sexual orientation discrimination.
In light of the state's silence on the specific issue of samesex marriage, while a New York court could still hold
that a samesex marriage is against New York's public policy, it would have an uphill battle in citing evidence for its
view.
At best, New York seems ambivalent about samesex marriages  hardly a basis for a public policy invalidation of
Langan's and Spicehandler's Vermont civil union. If the Full Faith and Credit Clause means anything, it ought to
mean that a state ought to have excellent reasons for rejecting another state's judgment. When it comes to
Vermont civil unions, New York does not.
Joanna Grossman, a FindLaw columnist, is an associate professor of law at Hofstra University.
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